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By DAVID G. TRAGER*
While the power to zone the urban land of America
may help to achieve a rational and humane method of
regulation of land in our society, the ability to use that
power effectively may be limited. Because ownership of
and investment in land is to a large extent in private hands,
the zoning power is often viewed as a threat to present
investment and opportunities for future profit-making. For
example, the small entrepreneurs, who are predominate in
the construction industry,' may be and often are financially
ruined if the zoning power is exercised even once against
their financial interests.
Because the powers given to municipal legislative
bodies, planning commissions and zoning boards of appealdirectly affect hundreds of billions of dollars in private in-
vestment, it is only natural that in a democratic society
the power would be subjected to controls. And, as is usualin American society, much of the effort to ensure that such
power will be exercised with a minimum amount of arbi-
trariness or favoritism has come from the state courts.
Over the years, the courts have developed various doc-
trines by which they have sought to channel the power
along rational and fair lines. For example, the adoption of
a zoning ordinance, as an exercise of the police power, must
protect or advance the public health, safety, and welfare.
A zoning ordinance, though purporting to achieve these
purposes, will be struck down as arbitrary or unreasonable
if it is clear that the zoning ordinance will not further
these goals.2 Somewhat more specific is the standard rule
that amendments to zoning laws which rezone small areas
of land, will be struck down as "spot zoning" if there was
no mistake in the original zoning ordinance or no change
of conditions in the area, and the change is not "in accord-
ance with a comprehensive plan."3
In recent years a new element has been added in thedevelopment of judicial control. Various state courts have
begun to attack a relatively new practice in the field of
zoning regulation. This practice, typically, involves the
* A.B. 1959, Columbia College, LL.B. 1962, Harvard Law School; Mem-
ber New York State Bar.I See Kelly, Design and the Production of Houses, pp. 7-11 (New York,
1959).
3!Gordon v. City of Wheaton, 12 Ill. 2d 284, 146 N.E. 2d 37 (1957).
'RAT KOPF & RATHKOPF, The Law of Zoning and Planning, (3d ed.
1960) 126-14. Hereafter, this work will be cited as RATHKOPF.
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rezoning of a piece of property to a zoning classification
with less restrictions subject to an agreement by the owner
of the property to abide by certain conditions. These con-
ditions often place limitations on the uses and the physical
development of the property that the other properties in
the new district do not bear. The courts have attacked this
as constituting "zoning by contract", "rezoning by con-
tract", "rezoning subject to conditions", or, simply, "con-
tract zoning".4 This article is a discussion and analysis of
contract zoning.
It will first attempt to explain the economic pressures
that have produced the practice and, then, to analyze pre-
liminarily the nature of contract zoning. This is not an
easy task for contract zoning resembles so many other as-
pects of zoning and, in some cases, is almost indistinguish-
able. In the second part of the article there is a critical
examination of the reasons given by the courts for their
condemnation of the practice. Of the five highest state
courts that have considered this technique of zoning, three
have held it unlawful.5 The general conclusion is that the
arguments made by the courts do not warrant an outright
condemnation of contract zoning. Its use in certain situa-
tions might be quite acceptable. In Part III, we seek to
support this view through a detailed comparison of con-
tract zoning with other possible methods of dealing with
the general problem that contract zoning seeks to resolve.
However, we have included in the discussion in this part
a proposal which, if adopted by the state legislatures, would
solve the problem more advantageously than does contract
zoning.
In Part IV, we return to the present legal situation with
a consideration and analysis of still further arguments
against the practice. The latter are for the most part not
discussed, if mentioned at all, in the opinions of the courts.
The article will then conclude with a brief discussion of
the general problem of contracts made by a municipality
with private individuals with respect to the exercise of
its regulatory (police) power.
I
In order to aid the reader to understand the following
discussion of contract zoning, the facts of two cases, which
'These terms will be used interchangeably throughout.
'The states that have attacked contract zoning are New Jersey,
Florida and Maryland. New York and Massachusetts have upheld it.
See ns. 9 and 10 for full listing of all relevant cases.
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are typical of the situations which the courts have de-
scribed as "rezoning by contract", are given.
In Hartnett v. Austin,6 Coral Gables, Florida had re-
zoned a parcel of property from single-family residential
to commercial use at the request of a holder of an option
to purchase. He desired to use the land for a parking lot
for a large shopping center situated nearby. The effective-
ness of the ordinance, however, was made dependent upon
the execution and recording of an agreement in which the
property owner promised to observe certain conditions. A
"bay-point" type wall, 40 feet inside the property line, was
to be erected and the resulting strip of land was to be kept
landscaped at the owner's expense. In addition, there were
requirements that there was to be no access to certain
abutting streets, that the owner should furnish adequate
police protection within the rezoned area, and that provi-
sion was to be made to prevent the glare of car lights on
certain neighboring residential streets.
In Baylis v. City of Baltimore7 neighboring property
owners in a residential district challenged a zoning ordi-
nance which permitted the use of a house as a funeral
parlor. The initial request was simply for a change in
classification. The planning commission had recommended
rejection of the request for rezoning. The board of zoning
appeals advised that the rezoning should pass as long as
the property was used only as a funeral home. After much
discussion between city officials and the owner, a zoning
ordinance was passed. The city council reduced the area
to be rezoned and made the effectiveness of the ordinance
conditional on the execution of an agreement which re-
quired that entrances and exits to the property be on a
named street, that adequate off-street parking be provided,
and that the zoning classification of the property would
automatically revert to its previous classification if the
property were not used as a funeral home. In both cases
the courts held the zoning amendments and the agreements
invalid.8
Though the practice of passing zoning amendments with
limitations on uses and with other controls has seemingly
become widespread, the challenges to the propriety of the
action are not as yet numerous, but the issue will probably
be presented to many state courts shortly.
An examination of the cases where contract zoning has
become an issue reveal two basic patterns in the underlying
093 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956).
7 219 Md. 164, 148 A. 2d 429 (1959).
8 Supra, ns. 6, 7.
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fact situations though the courts have not shown any
awareness of them. Each of them is the result of defects
in the present methods of zoning controls, and contract
zoning is an ad hoc attempt by municipal officials to solve
the problems caused by these defects.
The two cases, whose facts are given above, are each
representative of one of the basic patterns. These then are
the situations:
(1) Hartnett raises essentially the problem of zoning
controls when the land lies near the border of two very
different use classifications. A parcel of land in a resi-
dential zone lies close to a commercial area. The devel-
opment of the surrounding area is such that commercial
activities - retailing, for example - have become very
profitable. However, this profitableness has made land in
the commercial zone either very expensive or non-existent.
This creates great pressure on the neighboring residential
land. The owner of a parcel in the residential area or a
prospective purchaser, desirous of taking financial advan-
tage of the increased commerce, asks for rezoning of the
parcel. Honest public officials may want to accommodate
the owner either because they simply feel the parcel should
properly be used for commercial purposes, or because the
city can use the added taxables or businessY
9 The following cases present similar situations: Sylvania Elec. Products,
Inc. v. City of Newton .... Mass.. 183 N.E. 2d 118 (1962) ; Church
v. Town of Islip, 8 N.Y. 2d 254, 203 N.Y.S. 2d 866 (1960); Point Lookout
Civic Ass'n. v. Town of Hempstead, 22 Misc. 2d 757, 200 N.Y.S. 2d 925, 12
A.D. 2d 505, appeal dismissed, 9 N.Y. 2d 961, 217 N.Y.S. 2d 227 (1961).
In these three cases New York and Massachusetts, the states which
have most recently faced the issue, have upheld the legality of contract
zoning. They were the only ones to do so.
The cases listed immediately below are also of the Hartnett type fact
situation. Carole Highlands Citizens Ass'n, Inc. v. Bd. of Com'rs of Prince
Georges County, 222 Md. 44, 158 A. 2d 663 (1900); Rose v. Paupe, 221
Md. 369, 157 A. 2d 618 (1960) ;
Houston Petroleum Co. v. Automative Products Credit Ass'n, 9 N.J. 122,
87 A. 2d 319 (1952). See also Gregory Manor v. City of Clifton, 53 N.J.
Super. 482, 147 A. 2d 595 (1959) and -Beckman v. Township of Teaneck,
6 N.J. 530, 79 A. 2d 301 (1951).
In Pressman v. City of Baltimore, 222 Md. 330, 160 A. 2d 379 (1960).
the court found that the rezoning was not made conditional upon com-
pliance with any agreement by the developer, and, consequently, there
was no contract zoning as in the Baylis case. The developer, out of
consideration for the public good, bad agreed to fulfill various "requests"
of the city. Perhaps, the Maryland Court is retreating from the position
it took in the Baylis case for the facts of the case make is clear that
an agreement was made. Discussions had been going on between the
city and the developer when the Baylis decision came down. Recog-
nizing that a written agreement -and a conditional rezoning would be
invalid, no doubt an "understanding" was reached whereby the city
decided to rely on the honor of a responsible developer to perform the
agreement. The Baylis case itself acknowledged that these agreements
1963] CONTRACT ZONING
(2) In the second pattern the problem is that of the
declining residential area. There is a deteriorating resi-
dential area, which public officials believe should eventu-
ally be devoted to commercial uses, or if the area is already
a slum, they may simply believe that the public good re-
quires the removal of all slums. Perhaps a full rehabilita-
tion program is financially unfeasible for the community
at the time, and, as a result, officials welcome even small
physical improvements as a gain in their efforts to re-
develop the area. The Baylis case is an illustration of this
type of pattern. °
In both situations, however, the officials must also con-
sider the effect of the change on the nearby residential
areas." Homes may have been built in reliance on the
present zoning scheme, and the commercial development
may have an adverse effect on their value. Even if the
physical condition of the residential area is not the most
desirable, the area may still form a socially stable com-
munity. Political wisdom, if not sincere concern, dictate
that any change take account of the complaints, anger and
possible political retribution of the neighboring residents.
In an attempt to reconcile these conflicting pressures,
the city officials cast about for a compromise that will make
possible a complete accommodation or, at least, a politically
acceptable solution. The results of a search for a compro-
were commonly made. The court's opinion in Pressman certainly seems
disingenuous.
Conversely, In Sandenburgh v. Michigamme Oil Co., 249 Mich. 372,
228 N.W. 707 (1930), which is often cited as a contract zoning case, the
facts clearly show that the agreement had nothing to do with the passage
of the zoning ordinance. The city and neighboring property owners were
seeking to enforce a declaration of restrictions filed with the city by a
previous title holder a few years before the zoning ordinance was passed.
1oIn the Baylis category we find V. F. Zahodiakin Eng. Corp. v. Zoning
Board of Adjust., 8 N.J. 386, 86 A. 2d 127 (1952). See also Speakman
v. City of No. Plainfield, 8 N.J. 250, 84 A. 2d 715 (1951).
Town of Greenburgh v. Buser, 4 Misc. 2d 513, 148 N.Y.S. 2d 550
(1955) is often cited as a contract zoning case. But as the facts of the
case are not given, it cannot be determined into which category the
case falls.
n Though the typical case involves conflict on the boundary between a
residential and commercial zone, in Rose v. Paupe, supra, n. 9, the
conflict was between a summer cottage resort area and the owner of a
strip of waterfront. The latter wanted to build a pier for small
pleasure craft. Though it was not quite clear what was the zoning
classification of the strip, the pier appeared to be a forbidden use.
The case analytically is still a contract zoning situation for the city had
agreed, to rezone the property with the publicly stated stipulation that
the rezoning would be revoked if the owner attempted to make any use
of the property other than the proposed one. Once again there is the
attempt by public officials to solve land use control problems in border-
line areas of zoning districts.
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mise can be seen in the typical cases, whose facts are given
above. In exchange for allowing the proposed commercial
use, the council requires that measures be taken to mini-
mize the undesirable aspects of the proposed use. Thus
aesthetic, traffic, and other controls are imposed. But the
commercial development will proceed. In this way an ac-
ceptable political compromise is achieved.' 2
In seeking to find a legal method to implement their
compromise solution, officials have theoretically five possi-
ble techniques, other than contract zoning, by which the
proposed deviation from the present zoning requirements
can be achieved. They are: (1) an outright change to an
existing classification which allows the commercial use, but
without any conditions; (2) the granting of a variance;
(3) the creation of a new zoning classification containing
the necessary conditions followed by a rezoning of the
property involved into the new classification; (4) estab-
lishing "statutory" exceptions; and (5) the granting of
"administrative" exceptions. 3
1The facts of Sylvania Elec. Products, Inc. v. City of Newton, supra,
n. 9, the most recently decided case, gives an excellent picture of how city
officials attempted to accommodate all the interests involved.
13 Exactly what is an exception in zoning is unclear. Rathkopf speaks
of "conditional uses" or "special exception permits" and describes it as
follows:
"It permits the inclusion into the zoning pattern (either in all zones
or in certain particular zones) of uses considered by the legislative body
to be essentially desirable (or essential) to the community, its citizenry
or to substantial segments, thereof, but where the nature of the use or
its concomitants (traffic congestion, density of persons, noise, effect on
values, 9afety or health) militate against its location at every location
therein or in any location without restrictions or conditions tailored to
fit the special problems which the use presents." 1 RATMKOPF, 54-1.
According to Rathkopf, the board of zoning appeals can grant the ex-
ception subject to appropriate conditions and safeguards.
This description of an "exception" may have characteristics of con-
tract zoning, but is distinguishable.
But, as we shall see presently in the text, for dealing with the
problem described above, it has certain drawbacks. Essentially, contract
zoning deals with a problem which by its very nature cannot be solved
by a previously proposed statutory scheme. See Reus, Jr. v. City of
Baltimore, 220 Md. 566, 155 A. 2d 513 (1959) ; and Devereux Foundation,
Inc., Zoning Case, 351 Pa. 478, 41 A. 2d 744 (1945).
Another approach to the term "exception" is found in the statutory
scheme of New Jersey tested in Ward v. Scott, 11 N.J. 117, 93 A. 2d
385 (1952), R.S. 40 :55 - 39 (d), N.J.S.A. provides that the board of
adjustment may recommend to the governing body of the municipality
that a "variance" be granted "in particular cases and for special reasons."
It would seem that where the power to grant such variances under this
broad statute has been granted to zoning board of appeals, It has been
held to constitute an illegal delegation of power without standards.
1 RATHKOPF, 54-14.
Subsection (c) provided that board of adjustment could grant a
variance where there was "exceptional and undue hardship" upon the
property owner. This latter subsection constitutes what is generally
called a variance. The former, though called a variance by the majority,
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These methods of achieving the desired result will be
compared in the discussion in Part III of the merits of con-
tract zoning. For various reasons, all but the last technique
are either legally suspect, or unsuitable for achieving the
goal sought as compared to contract zoning. And since the
fifth alternative is not authorized under most present day
zoning laws"4 and would not be desirable under certain
circumstances, officials have developed the following pro-
cedure. A zoning amendment is passed placing the prop-
erty into an existing, but less restrictive district, but con-
ditioning the change on the agreement of the property
owner to subject "the property to restrictions of use or area
greater than those generally imposed by the zoning ordi-
nance upon the district into which the land has been re-
zoned."' 5 It is this solution that the courts have labelled
"rezoning by contract". (The courts have used the term
both to describe the acts done and to connote disapproval.)
Logically, the next question to be asked is how does
contract zoning differ in the abstract from some of the
other techniques of bringing about deviations from the
existing statutory zoning scheme? The courts have not
dealt with this question though, necessarily, their con-
demnation requires that contract zoning differ from accept-
able zoning practices. Implicit in the nature of contract
zoning, however, is the following possible, but rather
theoretical, analysis.
First of all, the imposition of conditions does not dis-
tinguish contract zoning from other methods of changing
present zoning restrictions. Conditions are often imposed
before favorable action is given on a request for a change
in the present land use controls. For example, the power
to grant variances upon conditions is clearly accepted.16
more properly was described by the dissenting justices as constituting an
exception.
The two definitions or types of exceptions differ essentially in that the
first is given in conformity with a previously laid out statutory scheme,
while -the second is, like a variance, an ad hoc act in derogation of the
existing zoning classification. In accordance with this distinction, we
shall designate the first type a "statutory" exception and the second an
"administrative" exception. The similarities and differences between
these approaches and contract zoning will be discussed in a little more
detail in n. 23.
See also Delafons, Public Control or Private Development - A Re-
port on Land Use Controls in America (1960). Copies of this work can
be found at Harvard University Planning Library.
U The New Jersey statute, supra, n. 13, with its liberal provisions
for allowing deviations in individual cases from the zoning laws appears
to be the only one granting such great discretion to its municipal officials.
15 2 RATHKOPF, 74-9.
16 1 RATHKOPF, 49-1 to 49-23.
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A possible distinction is that while the grant of a vari-
ance constitutes almost a legal right, the enactment of a
zoning amendment is a pure act of discretion. On author-
ity this contention would appear faulty. It is generally
held, despite some statements to the contrary, that the
granting of a variance is not required, even if the petitioner
makes a demonstration of "particular and undue hardship"
because of the existing zoning law. The showing is only a
necessary precondition to the obtaining of a variance. The
board of zoning appeals may in its discretion grant a vari-
ance. 7 But these statements must be qualified.
For it is the rule that if no use may be made of
a parcel of land under the restrictions of the present
zoning law, the ordinance is unconstitutional as applied to
that piece of property. 8 Consequently, variances may
often be granted in order to avoid such constitutional chal-
lenges to the zoning ordinance (though how often this
happens is not known). Similarly, while the board of
zoning appeals demands landscaping, fencing and other
moderate conditions in order to minimize the harmful
effects of the deviation on the surrounding area, the con-
ditions that may be put upon the grant of a variance are
not unlimited. 9 If the conditions are too severe or if the
variance is simply refused, the property owner may resort
to an outright attack on the present zoning law, and if he
is successful, he will obtain judicial approval to use his
property as he desires." Thus the power to grant a variance
may not wholly be a statutory gratuity, but a constitutional
necessity.2'
The granting of variances then, with or without condi-
tions, would not really be an act of discretion. Where there
is essentially no alternative but to grant the variance in
one form or another, then while it may not be a legal right
of the property owner to get a variance, it surely begins to
resemble a legal right.
On the other hand, the amending of a valid zoning ordi-
nance is a completely discretionary act on the part of the
municipal legislature. As one court said, "The city council
cannot be compelled to pass a rezoning ordinance, however
"Nelson v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Indianapolis, 240 Ind. 212, 162
N.E. 2d 449 (1959); Of. Pendergast v. Board of Appeals of Barnstable,
331 Mass. 555, 120 N.E. 2d 916 (1954).
iAverne Bay Const. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E. 2d 587
(1938); Dowsey v. Village of Kensington, 257 N.Y. 221, 177 N.E. 427
(1931); Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493,
121 N.E. 2d 517 (1954).
1" Rand v. City of New York, 155 N.Y. 2d 753 (1956).
"0Averne Bay Const. Co. v. Thatcher, supra, n. 18.
See BASSurT, ZONING (1936) 122.
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fair, reasonable, and desirable it may be, as that repre-
sents an exercise of legislative discretion."22
When, therefore, the municipality passes a zoning
amendment that it is within its sole power to pass, it can
be said to be giving a "consideration" for which it may
ask in return certain promises from the person desirous of
a change in his property's present classification. This ex-
plains why the courts may conceive of the passing of a
zoning amendment subject to conditions as constituting
"contract zoning." (Emphasis added.) The same distinc-
tion might also be drawn between contract zoning and a
statutory exception.2
Of course, on close examination the analysis breaks
down. The granting of a variance is, in practice, as well as
in the generally held theory, almost always an act of dis-
cretion. Few refusals to grant variances are upset by the
2Besselman v. City of Mioses Lake, 46 Wash. 2d 279, 280 P. 2d 689,
690 (1955).
2A statutory exception, (see n. 13) is commonly called a "conditional
use." On analysis, the distinction between this technique and contract
zoning becomes quite clear. The "conditional use" exception also deals
with certain special problems (e.g., gas stations in residential areas);
but these situations occur with enough frequency that a prior statutory
scheme can be set up to deal with the problem. It thus lacks that element
of uniqueness that is characteristic of both contract zoning and a variance.
Also, it lacks the element of discretion on the part of the public body
because upon a proper showing of compliance with the terms or conditions
of the authorizing statute, the petitioner is entitled as A matter of right
to the exception. Shell Oil Co. v. City of Manchester, cited loe. cit. supra,
n. 15. Even if there is discretionary power to impose conditions in the
granting of an exception, courts have held the discretionary power to be
limited to the explicit terms of the statute. Service Realty Corp. v.
Planning and Zoning Bd. of Ap., 141 Conn. 632, 109 A. 2d, 256 (1954).
If an "administrative" exception (see n. 13), is the granting of a
variance without a showing of "particular and undue hardship" for
"special reasons" by the municipal legislature, then indeed contract
zoning might properly be called a type of "exception". The refusal to
grant such an exception would probably not be challenged successfully.
There would be then the element of discretion on the part of the legislature.
In addition, a statute which authorizes an exception for "special reasons"
cannot be said to have laid down a statutory scheme. If the statute
withstands constitutional challenge, it would certainly seem to allow for
dealing with the ad hoe determinations that are characteristic of con-
tract zoning cases.
The difference between contract zoning and an "exception" as herein
defined lies in the fact that such an "exception" can be used to deal
with a much greater range of problems, whereas the technique of con-
tract zoning requires the passage of a zoning amendment whose validity
depends on meeting broad, but more certain tests. The latter, as ex-
plained in the text in the latter part of section II, has certain limiting
elements. The former thus raises more serious problems than does contract
zoning. Exceptions may put too broad discretion in the legislative branch.
The result might be unjustified 'or discriminatory deviations from the
existing zoning scheme. The power to grant exceptions would be sub-
ject to only minimal judicial control because the standard of for
"special reasons" even in the context of general purposes of zoning is
just too flexible.
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courts which have explicitly stated that variances should
be granted frugally.24 A constitutional attack on the zoning
ordinances on the grounds that the statute is confiscatory
is not likely to succeed .2  And the power to impose condi-
tions, though not unlimited, is still very broad.26 So vari-
ances are really not much different from contract zoning.
In both situations the property owner is allowed to deviate
from the present zoning law if the appropriate public body
is satisfied that the change is desirable or acceptable.
An attempt to distinguish various zoning techniques
from contract zoning on the basis of whether there the
change is an act of discretion is too theoretical to be useful
even if it is successful. Such an analysis does not explain
why courts have been striking down these agreements. In
their opinions, the courts only rarely disclose the real con-
siderations underlying their decisions, but it is those that
concern us.
Let us proceed, however, to examine critically the rea-
sons that are given by the courts for their attacks on con-
tract zoning. Then we shall try to examine the unexpressed,
but more basic policies or fears that lie behind the assault
on contract zoning.
II
The first attack against the procedure called contract
zoning is simply that it is not expressly authorized by the
zoning enabling acts or ordinances of the municipality.
Most of the courts that have attacked contract zoning make
the point - though with more or less emphasis. In a New
Jersey case the court found the procedure unauthorized
and described the actions of the public officials as "an ar-
rogation of authority in defiance of the statute and the
ordinance. '27
The author of the only legal writing on the question of
contract zoning devoted a great portion of his series of
short articles to the argument that since there was no ex-
press statutory authorization, the practice was illegal. 8
Yet in the same article he acknowledges that, on the basis
24 Talmadge v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 141 Conn. 639, 109 A. 2d 253
(1954).
" A zoning ordinance is not unconstitutional because it reduces the
value of or profits from a parcel of land. There must be an extensive
diminution of property values before a statute will even be considered to
constitute a confiscation of property without due process of law. Headley
v. City of Rochester, 272 N.Y. 197, 5 N.E. 2d 198 (1936).
2 Vasilakis v. City ;of Haverhill, 339 Mass. 97, 157 'N.E. 2d 871 (1959).
27 V. F. Zahodiakin Eng. Corp. v. Zoning Board of Adjust., 8 N.J. 386,
395, 86 A. 2d 127, 131 (1952).
18Crolly, The Rezoning of Properties Conditioned on Agreements with
Property Owners - "Zoning by Contract", N.Y. Law Journal, March
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of virtually the same zoning enabling act, while Maryland
had found the procedure unauthorized, New York had
reached the opposite conclusion. 9
The New York case is Church v. Town of Islip 0 In
finding that the town board had implied authority under
the zoning enabling act to rezone a parcel of land subject
to compliance with certain requirements, an appellate
court said that the practice "is (not) contrary to the spirit
of zoning ordinances and is (not) beyond the statutory
power of local legislative bodies."'"
And the Maryland court, which could not find any stat-
utory authorization for the practice of contract zoning,
said in its opinion that "[tihere is authority to the effect
that reasonable conditions and restrictions may be imposed
by a board in connection with a special exception or vari-
ance, at least where the power to do so is expressed, or may
be fairly implied."' 32 Why the authority cannot be implied
in the case of zoning amendments is not explained.
It is not enough in resolving the 'qiestion of statutory
authorization to demand express authorization.3 3 Nor is it
enough to say that "the test of validity of a municipal zon-
ing change is one of legislative power. It should not be
one of practice or expediency as stressed by the town in
the Church case. ' 34  Policy considerations, favorable to
contract zoning or not, must be taken into account in deter-
mining whether contract zoning fits in. with the overall
pattern of the zoning enabling law, especially where it is
clear the statute does not deal specifically with the
problem.35
8, 9, 10, 1961. See also Crolly & Norton, Zoning by Contract with Prop-
erty Owners, N.Y. Law Journal, April 6, 1955.
Hereafter these articles will be cited as "Crolly" followed by the date.
All the articles will be found on page 4 of the respective issues.
21 Id., March 8, 1961.
10 upra, n. 9.
U8 App. Div. 2d 962, 190 N.Y.S. 2d 927 (1959).
2Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 168, 148 A. 2d 429 (1959) (Em-
phasis added).
In 1956, four years before the Church case was decided, a bill was
passed by the New York legislature to give town boards the power to
pass zoning amendments subject to conditions. The bill, however, was
vetoed. From these facts a more respectable argument that contract
zoning was not authorized could be made. Crolly, March 8, 1961. However,
the Court of Appeals in the Church case ignored the legislative history
and found the power in the existing zoning enabling act.
Crolly, March 9, 1961.
For similar reasons, the technical argument made by the dissenter
in Sylvania Elec. Products, Inc. v. City of Newton .... Mass.
183 N.E. 2d 118 (1962) must also fail. He argued that because the
agreement provided for restrictions on land use, they were restrictions
imposed for zoning purposes, and since they could be imposed by means
of the zoning law, they must be imposed by the zoning law. The cn-
elusion does not follow from the premise unless one reads the Massa-
1963]
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The next line of attack against contract zoning is that
it is a "bargaining away" of the police power of the com-
munity. 6 The thesis that this cannot be done in its most
general form has been stated in hundreds of cases. A gen-
eral treatise puts it this way:
"A municipality has no power to make any agreement
or deal which will in any way control or embarrass its
legislative power and duties. Neither the police power
of the State itself nor that delegated by it to a munici-
pality is subject to limitation by private contract; nor
is the exercise, of such power to be alienated, surren-
dered or limited by any agreement or device."3
More specifically, the cases do not explain what unjus-
tifiable consequences the courts fear will ensue from the
agreements in contract zoning. The idea seems to be that
by passing a zoning amendment subject to the acceptance
of certain conditions by the property owner, the city has
struck a bargain by which the city has lost all its power to
legislate in the future with respect to that piece of property.
If the city intends in good faith to honor the agreement, it
is barred from later exercising its zoning power in ways
that will affect adversely the legality of the use permitted
by the agreement.
"[The city in order to] respect and not to impair its
obligation to such property owner, must refrain from
restoring the property to its former zoning even though
it realizes that a mistake was made by such conditional
rezoning. ' '31
But is it true that the agreement prevents the city from
exercising legitimately its police power with respect to
such property in the future? Certainly no express provi-
sions of the agreements mentioned in the cases so require;
nor may they be fairly implied.
Zoning laws in this country are normally not retro-
active in effect. The mere passage of a zoning law has no
effect on existing uses except to make them non-conform-
ing. The property owner need not halt his present use and
chusetts statute very literally. Restrictions on the use of property have
been imposed in Massachusetts by private deed both before and after
the zoning enabling statute was passed. There is no evidence that the
Massachusetts legislature sought to exclude the use of this method of
land control by municipalities when it passed the zoning enabling law.
The policy argument offered by the dissent to support its narrow reading
of the statute is discussed shortly in the text.
8 Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 558
(1914).
8 Crolly, April 6, 1955.
38 Crolly, March 9, 1961.
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has no complaint simply because his property is rezoned.
That the rezoning was proper according to established ju-
dicial tests is all the landowner may ask. 9
Assume, however, that the city seeks to bring to an end
the use it authorized by the zoning amendment and agree-
ment. This may be achieved by use of the general proce-
dures for the elimination of non-conforming uses,40 or even
by a more drastic attack on this use alone for:
"The reservation of essential attributes of sovereign
power is read into contracts as a postulate of the legal
order. All contracts are made with reference to the
possible exercise of the police power of the govern-
ment and with the possibility of such legislation as an
implied term of the law thereof...
Supreme Court cases give strong support to this state-
ment. One example of a case where the court allowed a
city to violate the terms of a contract is Denver & R. G.
R.R. Co. v. City and County of Denver,"' where the breach
came in the form of legislation directed solely at the rail-
road.
The facts of the case are these. The railroad had by
virtue of an authorizing ordinance placed a railroad track
in a street. The Court agreed that the ordinance had be-
come a contract, and thus the railroad had a vested prop-
erty right. Some years later the city ordered re-noval of a
portion of the railroad track. The Supreme Court held the
order was a valid exercise of the police power; no com-
pensation need be paid. The case is clear precedent for the
revocation of the rezoning and the agreement in a contract
zoning case upon a showing that the public welfare so
requires.
But the Supreme Court cautioned that the exercise of
the power must neither be unreasonable nor arbitrary.
Similarly, the property owner in a contract zoning situa-
tion would be entitled to have a strong showing of public
need and reasonableness, especially if the ordinance applies
to him alone.4" It would not be sufficient grounds for a
See Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E. 2d 731,
733 (1951).
40 See City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P. 2d 34
(1954) and cases cited therein.
"16 C.J.S. 1287, Constitutional Law, § 281.
"250 U.S. 241 (1919). See also Boston Beer Co. v. M'assachusetts, 97
U.S. 25 (1887).
'"Endara v. Culver City, 140 Cal. App. 2d 158, 294 P. 2d 1003 (1956);
Kessler v. Smith, 104 Ohio App. 213, 142 N.E. 231 (1957), appeal
dismissed, 167 Ohio St. 91, 146 N.E. 2d 308 (1957).
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revocation that the public officials simply regretted their
prior approval for political reasons.
The New York Court of Appeals' answer to the argu-
ment that the town's action in Church v. Town of Islip
involved a contracting away of the police power was that
the argument was de minimis in the circumstances of this
case.
44
Neither in theory nor in any practical sense had the
town diminished its ability to act for the welfare of its
residents. The contract zoning cases do not involve situa-
tions such as that which existed in the New York case of
Bartholemew v. Village of Endicott et al.45 There the vil-
lage made a contract whereby it agreed to "confine its
electric operations and sales to the portion of the village"
already being served by the municipal system. In this
case, the court held, the village is completely abdicating
its normal role of providing public services and leaving its
citizens who are not part of the municipal power network
to fend for themselves. In the case of contract zoning there
is no such wholesale attempt by the officials to abdicate
their responsibilities to the community.
Still another argument that has been made against
contract zoning is that since the conditions imposed on the
property are extra the zoning law and can only be found
in a recorded agreement, there is no notice to the public
of the restrictions that the property bears.46 In practice,
the argument fails. The prospective purchaser of neighbor-
ing land who desires to use such property for residential
"8 N.Y. 2d 254, 259, 203 N.Y.S. 2d 866 (1960).
"59 N.Y.S. 2d 84 (1945). See also the very interesting case of Schwab
v. Graves, 221 App. Div. 357, 223 N.Y.S. 160 (1927) appeal dismissed,
247 N.Y. 575, 161 N.E. 188 (1928). The court held invalid a contract
between Cheektowaga, a town east of Buffalo, and the latter city. The
contract provided that in exchange for allowing the city to build an
incinerator in the town, Buffalo would release a substantial debt Of the
town. Prior to the execution of the agreement, the town had an
ordinance forbidding such a building within its border. The case on its
face seems an outrageous attempt by public officials to use its regulatory
power to settle a public debt in total disregard of the public welfare.
However, close examination of the facts casts doubt on the judgment
because the contract provided for stringent controls over the proposed
use. In addition, the town was to have use of the facilities.
See also Atlantic Beach Assn. v. Hempstead, 3 N.Y. 2d 434, 165 N.Y.S.
2d 737 (1957).
" "[A] municipal ordinance should be clear, definite and certain in
its terms . . . [because there] is the necessity for notice to 'those affected
by the operation and the effect of the ordinance...
"[R]estrictions on property rights must be declared as a rule of law
in the ordinance and not left to the uncertainty of proof by extrinsic
evidence whether parol or written." Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 88,
89 (Fla. 1956).
This is also the policy argument of the dissent in Sylvania Elec.
Products, Inc. v. City of Newton, supra, n. 35.
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purposes will be on notice of a potentially undesirable use
nearby. For, under the procedure of contract zoning, for-
mally the property will have been rezoned, and the zoning
map will show the property to be in a commercial district.
Thus no real purpose would be served by the presence of
the contract conditions in the zoning map. The fact that
there are still further restrictions imposed under a contract
with the city may be analogized to and often is the same
as the uncountable number of private covenants running
with the land made by private persons and whose existence
is also not reflected in the zoning map.
If the courts are concerned about notice to prospective
buyers of the rezoned parcel, this problem has been ade-
quately dealt with in the contract zoning cases. The offi-
cials have required a recording of the agreement in the
county clerk's or similar office where any future purchaser
can always check the chain of title for any further restric-
tions on the use of the property.
Probably the most substantial and severest criticism of
contract zoning made by the courts is that it constitutes
illegal "spot zoning." 7
Zoning in our time has become synonymous with dis-
tricting. Zoning ordinances are based on the theory that
the public welfare requires that there be a segregation of
incompatible land uses. Consequently, a municipality must
rationally segregate uses among different classifications and
then rationally distribute the land in the community among
each of the categories of uses. After passing a zoning ordi-
nance, a municipality must not allow a property owner to
then use his land for a use other than one permitted in his
district by the zoning ordinance." To allow an unauthor-
ized use would be a violation of the basic purpose and
theory of zoning. In addition, unjustifiable discrimination
would result against those who are not allowed to escape
the requirements of the ordinance, i.e. to those without
political influence, or to those who expended funds in reli-
ance that the zoning ordinance would be rigorously en-
forced to keep out objectionable uses. Many years ago,
Bassett, a leading authority, pointed out that such dis-
crimination would have gravely weakened the cause of
zoning politically. 9 Thus uniformity within each zoning
district has always been a requirement of zoning enabling
acts.
47 See Crolly, April 6, 1955.
48 Caesel v. City of Baltimore, 195 Md. 348, 73 A. 2d 486 (1950).
49 BASSETT, op. cit. svipra, n. 21, 50.
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The courts have been quick to condemn any evasion of
this requirement by public officials. The simple process of
an amendment to the zoning map, which changes the clas-
sification of a particular parcel of property has been recog-
nized by the courts to be at times a subterfuge to avoid the
requirement. 0 The courts have attempted to identify the
characteristics of legitimate amendments involving small
parcels of land ("spot zoning"). Zoning amendments, it
is usually said, must be made for the general welfare; they
must not be just a "special privilege" for the property
owner.
51
The similarity between contract zoning and "spot zon-
ing" has not been missed by the courts. Here, too, uniform-
ity in a district is being destroyed. And so it is not un-
expected to find in every case involving a contract zoning
fact situation the usual arguments that are made for uni-
formity in zoning districts and against unwarranted
changes in zoning classifications. Contract zoning subverts
the basic zoning plan; in the course of time, it will produce
conditions as chaotic as those that existed before zoning.2
In fact, contract zoning seems to be but an aggravated
form of this disease because when a municipality has re-
zoned a property without conditions, its actions at least
appear to constitute a judgment that changed conditions
in the neighborhood of the property require a reclassifica-
tion for the general welfare. When rezoning is made sub-
ject to conditions, however, the board's actions begin to
look not like an act of sound judgment of what the public
good requires, but a bargain that is feasible politically, but
still made for the benefit of a private individual. The con-
ditions appear to have been added only for the purpose of
meeting any political or legal challenge.
"The action of a municipality in rezoning downward
a parcel of property of an owner who in aid thereof
makes such an offer or agreement can never be based
upon a free and independent exercise of judgment and
discretion of the governing body." 53
More expansive is the following statement by the court
in Hartnett v. Austin:
"In exercising its zoning powers the municipality must
deal with well-defined classes of uses. If each parcel
50 Cassel v. City of Baltimore, supra, n. 48, 355.
V. F. Zahodiakin Eng. Corp. v. Zoning Board of Adjust., 8 N.J. 386,
86 A. 2d 127, 131 (1952).
' Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 165, 148 A. 2d 429 (1959);
Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 89 (Fla. 1956).
3Crolly, April 6, 1955.
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of property were zoned as the bases of variables that
could enter into private contracts, then the whole
scheme and objective of community planning and zon-
ing would collapse. The residential owner would never
know when he was protected against commercial en-
croachment .... This is so because all genuine stand-
ards would have been eliminated from the zoning ordi-
nance. The zoning classification of each parcel would
then be bottomed on individual agreements and private
arrangements that would totally destroy uniformity.
Both the benefits of and reason for a well-ordered com-
prehensive zoning ordinance would be eliminated.""
But, as already has been pointed out, one class of con-
tract zoning cases involves changes made in borderline
areas between two quite different zoning districts. Near the
property in question are usually residences on one side and
commercial buildings on the other. From the point of view
of the old zoning classification, an inconsistent use is being
allowed into a residential area, and the uniformity of uses
is being destroyed. Seen, however, from the point of view
of the uses in the surrounding commercial area, there is no
destruction of uniformity for the use to be made of the
property is quite consistent with the requirements of the
commercial district.
The issue of uniformity then resolves into the more
accurate question - to which uniformity does one look?
Should there be conformity to the requirements of the old
residential or of the neighboring commercial classification?
It is not necessarily the old zoning classification, for if it
were, no amendment of the zoning ordinance involving
relatively small areas would ever be permissible since the
change would permit uses not allowed in the old zoning
classification. But that is not the law; even in states which
have outlawed contract zoning, not all changes of classifi-
cations of comparatively small parcels of property con-
stitute illegal "spot zoning."55
The validity of zoning amendments has been tested
constantly by the courts according to certain traditional,
but rather vague, formulas. It is usually said that there
must be proof of either changed circumstances or that an
error was made in the original zoning classification.56 Usu-
ally, a reference is made to the zoning enabling acts' re-
"Supra, note 52, 89.
Huff v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 214 Md. 48, 133 A. 2d 83 (1957);
Chayt v. Maryland Jockey Club, 179 Md. 390, 18 A. 2d 856 (1941).
5' 1 RATHKOPF, 27-1.
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quirement that any change must be "in accordance with a
comprehensive plan. '5 7 How courts apply these formulas
is far from clear. One renowned academic has written:
"[B]y what standard can a court decide whether in
fact the change is an improper one or whether it suc-
cessfully meets constitutional and statutory tests of
validity?
"An element apparently common to all the cases
dealing with this problem is consideration of whether
the zoning action under attack conforms to some sort
of general plan - that is, whether it may be defended
as logically related to something broader than and
beyond itself. This general plan, or comprehensive
plan, with which the amendment must conform, is
many things to many courts. It may be the basic
zoning ordinance itself, or the generalized 'policy' of
the local legislature or planning authorities in respect
to their city's development-or it may be nothing more
than a general feeling of fairness and rationality."58
If it is proper at times to change zoning classification
though it destroys uniformity with the old districts, there
is no reason why rezoning by contract automatically fails
to meet the requirement of uniformity. Both involve es-
sentially the same legislative act - an amendment to the
zoning ordinance. The standards for judging the change in
zoning classifications in a contract zoning situation can be
the same ones, be they strict or flexible, used to test
whether an unconditional zoning amendment constitutes
illegal "spot zoning."59 In other words, if a change to a
less restrictive classification in the contract zoning situa-
tion, considered without the conditions, would be war-
ranted, then a fortiori the restrictions imposed by the pub-
u' Standard State Zoning Enlabling Act § 3. Hereafter, the act will be
cited as the "Standard Act". The act may be found in 1 RATHKOPF, ZONING
AND PLANNING (3d ed. 1962) § 100-1 et seq.
8Haar, "In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan", 68 Harv. L.
Rev. 1154, 1167 (1955).
6 In land use planning, commercial districts are considered "less re-
strictive" for two reasons. First, a residence Wtay be permitted in a
commercial zone, but not the converse. Thus the alternative uses open to
a property owner in a commercial district are much greater. Euclid v.
Ambler Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). But the first reason may not always
apply. Zoning ordinances often exclude residential uses from commercial
districts.
The second reason applies almost universally. It is simply the fact
that if a vacant parcel is used for commercial purposes, the return on an
investment is generally higher, and, in this sense the zoning of property
for commercial uses is "less restrictive" of the property owner's common
law right to use his property as he desires.
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lic body to minimize the conflicts among districts would
not violate any requirement of uniformity with the old
zoning classification."
Even if the municipal officials may have considered only
the property owner's proposed use in agreeing to the re-
zoning, if the court finds every permitted use of the new
zoning classification would be justifiable for the property
in question, then by one typical test, there is no invalid
"spot zoning." If, however, not every use would be ac-
ceptable, this means that while there may have been some
changes in the general conditions in the area, they have not
been sufficient to justify a change in zoning classification.6 1
Similarly, other tests of the propriety of a zoning amend-
ment should be applied to a contract zoning case. For
example, generally, if conditions in the rezoned property
are indistinguishable from those existing in other property
in the area, the rezoning is invalid as an arbitrary dis-
crimination.2 Thus in the Baylis case the funeral home
was to be in a general residential area, which though prob-
ably deteriorating, was still overwhelmingly residential so
far as the facts show. The deterioration was probably gen-
eral and so the proposed amendment should not be an ad
hoc solution for a particular, but indistinguishable, parcel
of property. Rather a general reconsideration of land use
control in the area should be undertaken. The court would
seem to be correct in condemning the officials' action as
invalid "spot zoning." This would tend to be generally
true of the class of cases, Group (2), whose facts resemble
the situation in the Baylis case.63
0 In Church v. Town of Islip, 8 N.Y. 2d 254, 203 N.Y.S. 2d 866 (1960)
the New York Court of Appeals implicitly used this analysis - for it
said that a rezoning of the property for commercial purposes without
any conditions would have been valid. See the comment on the case in18 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 129. In the recently decided Massachusetts case,Sylvania Elec. Products, Inc. v. City of Newton .... Mass. 183
N.1. 2d 118 (1962) the court relies partly on the reasoning given above,but still emphasizes that the property was in form placed in a limited
manufacturing district without any conditions. The property owners be-
came legally bound to comply with certain conditions, other than thatimposed by the zoning ordinance, only subsequently and by their own
voluntary act. Yet the court acknowledges that the inducement for the
rezoning was the "agreement" reached previously with the property
owner. The latter is a large, nationwide electrical manufacturer whom
the city council no doubt trusted to carry out a plan under whichlegally valid restrictions would be imposed on the property.
'Conlon v. Board of Public Works of City of Paterson, 11 N.J. 363,94 A. 2d 660 (1953); Freeman v. City of Yonkers, 205 Misc. 947, 129
N.Y.S. 2d 703 (1954).
12Zaehring v. Long Beach Tp., 56 NJ. Super. 26, 151 A. 2d 425(1959).
"See n. 10.
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However, in Hartnett the result would seem wrong if
based on the theory that contract zoning is illegal "spot
zoning." The property was a vacant lot next to a large
shopping center. The building of a residential structure,
though possible, would not be very desirable. Nor was
there any evidence that the surrounding residential area
was deteriorating, or that a general rezoning of the area
was needed. The area was probably a large, post-war de-
velopment. But for the land in question the most appro-
priate use would be a commercial one. Of course, the fact
that a parking lot was the intended use, though less ob-
noxious than other possible commercial uses, is irrelevant
in determining the legality of the zoning change under the
analysis given above. All the potential commercial uses
must be theoretically acceptable.
In summary it is clear that because a zoning amend-
ment is made conditional on a property owner's agreement
to accept certain use restrictions or other conditions, it is
not necessarily unlawful "spot zoning." The fact that there
is a contract between the city and the property owner is
irrelevant to the issue whether there has been a proper orjustifiable deviation from the uniformity of the old zoning
district.
It would be appropriate to take notice at this point of
an argument made by the courts which essentially restates
the general argument that contract zoning is invalid "spot
zoning" by referring to one of the vices of "spot zoning."
It is argued that rezoning by contract upsets the ex-
pectations of persons under the older more restrictive
zoning classification. These persons may have expended
substantial amounts of money in reliance on the present
zoning scheme, and they have a right to have their ex-
pectations respected.6 4 Again, it is clear that it is not the
contract in contract zoning that destroys their expectations,
but it is the passage of the zoning amendment which makes
this new use possible. But as the Oregon Supreme Court
said,
"Property owners have no vested right by reason of
the enactment of an ordinance establishing use dis-
tricts. No contractual relations are thereby created.
Property is held subject to a valid exercise of the
police power."65
Hartnett v. Austin, supra, n. 52, 89.
Page v. City of Portland, 178 Ore. 632, 165 P. 2d 280, 283 (1946)
(dictum).
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And if a municipal legislature has the power to put
through a zoning amendment without conditions, the neigh-
boring residents, in a contract zoning case, have no cause
for complaint because conditions are imposed. For
"[S]urely they are intended to be and are for the benefit
of the neighbors," 6 as they are imposed to minimize any
adverse effects on these residents.
If the foregoing analysis of contract zoning is correct, it
would then seem that the courts are not without standards
by which to judge the propriety of a contract zoning situa-
tion. The standards, however, are not different from those
in any other case involving rezoning of small parcels of
land. The argument made in the Baylis case that, unlike
variances, there are no limits to the use of this technique is
untrue. The zoning ordinance would not be reduced to a
series of "deals" made according to the ability of each
property owner to bargain effectively.
Properly viewed then, the contract in contract zoning is
an act of political accommodation of conflicting pressures
in the community." On the one hand, there is the pressure
for commercial developments to provide services to the
citizens and added taxables. On the other hand, there is
the adverse effect on residential areas that the change may
have. The resolution of these pressures in the form of con-
tract zoning raises very difficult legal or policy considera-
tions, but it is not that involved in a charge of illegal "spot
1 Church v. Town of Islip, supra, n. 60, 259.
'Before closing this section, another Issue raised by Crolly should be
mentioned. (March 10, 1961). The problem is when and how may the
agreement be released or modified? Crolly cites as an example of the
problem, Vasilakis v. City of Haverhill, 339 Mass. 97, 157 N.E. 2d 871
(1959). In that case the court held that once a zoning variance is
granted on a stated condition, the owner is bound and must abide by
such condition, which prohibited a certain use though a subsequent zoning
ordinance made use legal In the district.
The case, though it seems very unjust, does provide an answer to
the problem. When the conditions in the neighborhood (e.g. the entire
area is now predominantly commercial) have so changed that the pur-
pose of the agreement would no longer be served by its continued
enforcement, then a court should by sound principles of equity and
construction of the agreement hold the agreement terminated, unless
the agreement expressly otherwise provides.
See also Hubbord v. Raynor, N.Y. Law Journal, Jan. 13, 1959 (Suf-
folk County) (Unreported). Here, too, proper construction of the agree-
ment would solve the problem that arose when property owner was not
able to use his property as he had originally intended. He sought then
to use his property as a gasoline station, which was a permitted use in
the new zoning district, but would have been a violation of the ex-
press purpose of the agreement The court properly held that he could
not so use his property. The agreement should be construed as restoring
the property to its old classification if the proposed employment of the
property is not carried out.
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zoning." These considerations will be discussed shortly.
(See Part IV.)
But our analysis of the relationship of contract zoning
and "spot zoning" leads to one definitive conclusion. With
regard to the Baylis type of case, contract zoning is not an
acceptable formula for allowing the intrusion into the midst
of a residential area of a completely non-conforming and
inappropriate use. To do so would undermine the very
theory on which zoning rests. Without questioning the
motivations of any public official, we can say that a piece-
meal approach to rehabilitation of decaying residential
areas is no longer acceptable. A general deterioration in a
residential neighborhood calls for a comprehensive muni-
cipal program of renovation or renewal of the area includ-
ing, perhaps, the designation of the area as desirable for
commercial, industrial or other uses. The whole concept of
zoning is predicated on the theory that there should be
municipal planning in the distribution of the community's
land among various uses. Public officials should not be
allowed to abdicate their obligations in this respect by ap-
proving patchwork restoration projects without any con-
sideration of a general program of redevelopment of the
decayed area. Nor should they be permitted to favor one
property owner among many similarly situated.
The reasoning of the courts has on the whole failed,
however, to justify any wholesale condemnation of con-
tract zoning." Furthermore, the facts of the cases lead one
to feel that most of the agreements that the courts have
struck down seem to have been fair, reasonable, and mod-
erate. They appear to have been good faith attempts to
resolve defects in present day zoning laws.
III
Much support for the use of contract zoning in the
Hartnett type case can be derived from the fact that con-
tract zoning is one of the two most acceptable techniques
under the existing theory of zoning to solve the general
predicament exemplified by the facts of that case.
There is a str~ong element of lanomalousness in the condemnation.
Most of the tests of the legality of a rezoning look essentially to the
result of the change, not the means of bringing it about - if they are
reasonable. The questions usually asked are: how does the chhnge
affect the neighboring land? Or is the change "in accordance with the
comprehensive plan?" If the procedural requirements of the enabling
statute are substantially observed, the courts try to deal with the merits
of the proposed change.
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Let us examine the possible use of the five alternative
methods, listed in Part I, of changing zoning controls. We
may quickly rule out the first two possibilities.
The first would be an outright change of classification
without the imposition of any conditions. Such a solution
would be politically unacceptable. The officials would have
to rely on the property owners abiding by the agreed upon
conditions. This, certainly, would not satisfy the protesting
neighboring property owners, and, probably not the public
officials. For it would leave the property owner subject
only to the general requirements of the new commercial
zoning classification, which is not likely to contain the
conditions the public officials feel are required.
The second method would be the granting of a variance
by the board of zoning appeals. The grant of a variance
normally can contain conditions. 9 But the necessary show-
ing of "a particular and unnecessary hardship", 70 which is
a prerequisite for the granting of a variance, could not be
made here. A profitable or a reasonable use could probably
still be made of the property under its present zoning
classification.
A third possible answer is that the zoning ordinance
might be amended to set up a new zoning classification.
The property would then be in a district of its own with
the needed conditions and use requirements. If officials
intended to make the new classification generally applicable
to the border area, then in order to take account of diverse
physical conditions, the requirements of the new classifica-
tion would have to be general. Consequently, the classifi-
cation would be inadequate for the particular problem
raised by the situation.
If the new classification were made specific enough to
deal with the particular problem, it could not be applied
generally. Then a whole series of classifications would have
to be made up to deal with the thousands of possible prob-
lems in areas adjacent to the borders of dissimilar use
classifications.
Clarity and, if possible, simplicity in statutes are de-
sirable in order to give the general public notice of the
course of conduct expected 71 and to mitigate the possibility
of invidious discrimination. The result of making new ad
1 YOKLEY, Z01VMnG LAw ANn PRACTICE, (2d ed. 1953) § 144.Id., § 138.
71 Bassett thought it Was very important in the area of zoning that
landowners should be able to obtain easily notice of the classification
of their property, supra, n. 21, 51. A complex zoning scheme is not neces-
sarily inconsistent with notice of classification. The important issue
here is discrimination.
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hoc classifications would be a zoning ordinance so detailed,
so lengthy, so complex, and, consequently, so arbitrary that
no court would allow it to stand.72 The multitudinous
classifications of such a cluttered zoning statute must fall
even if such a system could be said to contribute to the
public welfare.73
Contract zoning does not burden the zoning law with
unnecessary details. Nor does it create such a great danger
of unjustified discrimination. The desired simplicity of the
zoning laws can be retained, while adequate notice is
given the citizenry of what zoning controls there are on
any piece of property. Furthermore, contract zoning, as
analyzed here, would have to face the same tests that any
other zoning amendment would. And those tests, while
far from perfect, at least assure that favoritism to influen-
tial persons will be minimized.
It has been suggested that the employment of statutory
exceptions might provide an answer to the problem of
zoning in border areas. But this technique also has serious
failings. Statutory exceptions are part of a general statu-
tory scheme carefully thought out in advance, whereas the
situation that contract zoning seeks to deal with is unique
to each case and cannot practically be prepared for.
The public officials, in seeking to allow a change in use
which they feel is justified, want to mollify the protests of
opposing residents and voters. Such an act of political
compromise is by its very nature unique to every fact
situation. The amount and type of conditions needed to
make a commercial development blend with a surrounding
residential area are a function of such variables as the
degree of protest, the nature of the proposed use, and the
official's conception of what the public good requires. In
one case the problem may be reduced to a question of
aesthetics. Shrubbery or fencing are required. In a second
case, it may be conformity to a special kind of architecture
in the area that is demanded. In. still a third case, it is the
noise or traffic of the proposed use. So various controls
are imposed to minimize these objections. Access to the
property from a residential street is forbidden. In a fourth
case, it may be the size of the project or an undesirable use
that is the cause of protest. Restrictions are placed then
on the heights of buildings to be constructed, the area of
the plot to be covered by the buildings, the times in which
72 For a similar case see Rockhill v. Chesterfield Township, 23 N.J. 117,
128 A. 2d 473 (1957).
7 A case that has both elements, gross discrimination and possible public
benefit, is Marie's Launderette v. City of Newark, 35 N.J. Super. 94, 113
A. 2d 190 (1955). The zoning ordinance was held unconstitutional.
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certain activities may be carried on. Since such individual-
ized treatment for each situation is required, a generalized
statute to deal with the problem cannot be written.
Statutory exceptions have commonly been used to allow
gasoline stations into various areas of the municipality
where such a commercial use would not normally be per-
mitted."4 But the great need for gas stations in all parts of
the community has been accepted. Thus a statute is drafted
which provides that when certain conditions have been
met, an exception will allow the building of the station.
Normally construction of the station must follow certain
standards of construction and design set forth in the statute
though the statute may authorize the imposition of still
further detailed controls by municipal officials in each
case. The problem of the need for gasoline stations in non-
business areas is susceptible to a previously prepared statu-
tory solution for the problem occurs often enough that it
can be foreseen, and it is narrow enough for there to be a
reasonable category of relevant requirements.
Though it is certain that complications on the borders
of zoning districts with very diverse uses are bound to
occur, the problems do not fall into a reasonable number
of categories. Furthermore, it is almost impossible that the
specific problems raised by each parcel of property can be
foreseen. To do that we would have to know what every
property owner, present and future, would like to do with
his property.
It has been previously mentioned that an administrative
exception might provide a better -solution to the problem
than does contract zoning. Under that scheme, the board of
zoning appeals or the municipal legislature would be em-
powered to grant exceptions limited to -dealing with the
problems of residential area adjacent to business zones.75
74 1 Rathkopf at 54-2, See Shell Oil Company v. City of Manchester, 101
N.Y. 76, 133 A. 2d 501 (1957).
"A possible example of such a statute can be found in R. D'ordine
& Son v. Zoning Board of Review, 79 R.I. 489, 90 A. 2d 416 (1952). There
would seem to be good reason to place the responsibility for administering
such a statute with the board of zoning appeals, whose members,
theoretically, have developed an expertise in dealing with the very
analogous question of conditions imposed on the granting of a variance,
or who may have more personal integrity. These assumptions, however,
of expertise and probity may rest on very tenuous grounds in many cases.
See infra, n. 85.
It will not do to argue that this function belongs with the board of
zoning appeals because the issue partakes of an administrative question
and, therefore, is an inappropriate issue for a legislature, who should
concentrate on overall policy. Anyone in the least familiar with the
problems and politics of municipal government knows that the difficult
distinction of what is a legislative and what is an administrative question
raised by the division of powers in the national government becomes an
impossibly fuzzy issue at the municipal level of government.
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The statute would have the usual requirement of a public
hearing. In this way the public, i.e. the neighboring home
owners, will have the opportunity to express their views.
The statute would also demand that the situation on that
parcel of land be unique. Specifically, it must be the only
piece of undeveloped property facing the commercial zone.
This requirement will assure that public officials do not
attempt to evade their responsibility to rezone generally
when circumstances require, and other nearby property
owners will thereby be protected against discrimination.
Under this solution the zoning ordinance would not have
to be amended, and the property would remain in its old
district. No further deviation from the present statutory
scheme than that expressly approved would be allowed.
The hard questions of "spot zoning" that are raised by
zoning amendments will be avoided.
The public could focus on the merits of the specific pro-
posals of the landowner and can come up with a plan
tailored to the needs of the situation. The property owner
would have no real grounds for complaint if the public
officials in an honest exercise of discretion do not grant
the exception on his or any terms for he may always use
his property for a present lawful use.7
Aside from this solution, contract zoning is the most
effective and desirable way to solve the problem of accom-
modating neighboring commercial and residential uses. As
the New York court said in the Church case:
"To meet increasing needs of Suffolk County's own
population explosion, and at the same time to make as
gradual and as little of an annoyance as possible the
change from residence to business on the main high-
ways, the town board imposes conditions. 7 7
But even a flexible technique like an administrative ex-
ception would not be preferable to contract zoning in the
following circumstances. A New Jersey statute, for ex-
ample, allows the granting of what is essentially an ad-
ministrative exception "in particular cases and for special
reasons." 78 The facts in a contract zoning situation would
seem to be a "particular case:" In addition, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey held that this vague statute could be
tested by the purposes enumerated in the zoning enabling
act and the local ordinance.79 But the breadth of the pur-
76 Ibid.




pose in the typical zoning law is so great that it is equiva-
lent to no standard. It lists every desirable goal of land use
planning, but these goals are very general and may be
contradictory. 0
Contract zoning as analyzed above, seems to provide
much more definite standards in comparison. An exception
could be allowed under the New Jersey statute in any area
for many different reasons. Under such a statute the re-
quirement of uniformity would become meaningless. At
least in the case of contract zoning the damage to uniform-
ity would be limited to the fringes of a zoning district. A
statute authorizing the use of administrative exceptions
would have to be carefully drawn to limit its use to the
problem of zoning controls in the area between two radi-
cally different use districts if we are to avoid the problems
raised by the broad New Jersey statute.
IV
Assuming, however, that contract zoning is analyzed as
a compromise of conflicting pressures on certain uniquely
placed parcels of land that do not necessarily violate any
express statutory requirement, or the theory or pattern of
existing zoning enabling laws, that does not settle the
question of the propriety of allowing public officials to con-
tract with private parties to achieve the political com-
promise.
There are other considerations, and they make it im-
possible to treat the charge of contract zoning in the same
summary fashion the New York court did. What are these
considerations?
In most of the contract zoning cases, passing statements
can be found to the effect that rezoning by contract is in
essence the granting of "special privileges" to property
owners for illegitimate reasons. Behind these cryptic state-
ments lies the courts' fears of corruption or political favor-
itism. There is also the fear that officials will use considera-
tions not appropriate to land use control programs. Thus
in V. F. Zahodiakin Eng. Corp. v. Zoning Board of Adjust.8'
an exception subject to conditions was approved allowing
the plaintiff to remodel his buildings and use them for
light manufacturing purposes though the surrounding area
10 Standard Act § 3, one example of possible cross purposes. One goal
listed is "to avoid undue concentration of population". In New York
City, however, this goal cannot be achieved in many areas if the city is
going "to prevent the overcrowding of land" in order to have space for
parks and other recreational activities.
S8 N.J. 386, 86 A. 2d 127 (1952).
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was completely residential. The reason for the granting
of the exception, though not explicitly stated, was that the
officials probably wanted to increase the tax revenues and
possibly the employment opportunities for the community's
residents. Though these are desirable purposes in an over-
all zoning plan, such justifications are almost never accept-
able for allowing light manufacturing in the midst of a
residential area. 2 The lack of acceptable purpose was
further demonstrated by the way the case came up in court;
the case came up ten years after the exception was orig-
inally granted when the corporation requested a continua-
tion of the exception which was limited to ten years. At
that time the area was still zoned and was in fact solidly
residential. A zoning amendment of a relatively small
parcel of land must be made in light of present or probable
future land uses in the surrounding area, and this one was
not.
The fear of irrelevant considerations, aside from out-
right corruption and political favoritism, in rezoning situ-
ations is probably decisive in the courts' thinking about
contract zoning. This is rarely acknowledged by the courts
because they can never really know what went on in the
private offices of public officials in any particular case. This
unstated anxiety that the real considerations behind the
change are not disclosed also explains why the courts'
opinions in rezoning cases are often unenlightening.
The general inability of the courts to articulate exact
standards for determining the propriety of zoning changes
is a factor that heightens their doubts about zoning amend-
ments, and, naturally, makes them suspicious of contract
zoning. Still another factor in the situation is that gener-
ally a strong presumption is raised in favor of changes in
municipal zoning ordinances, or, more commonly, the
party attacking them must bear the risk of non-persua-
sion.s5 This adds to the courts' sense of helplessness in
dealing with the situation."' How important these two
additional factors are cannot be ascertained,s5 but they
8 Ward v. Montgomery Twp., 28 N.J. 529, 147 A. 2d 248 (1959);
Campbell v. Borough of Hillsdale, 12 N.J. Super. 182, 79 A. 2d 321 (1951).
8 Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E. 2d 731 (1951) ;
however, Maryland seems to take an intermediate position. See Wake-
field v. Kraft, 202 Md. 136, 96 A. 2d 27 (1952). The presumption in favor
of rezoning is not as great.
1, See Haar, Land-Use Planning (1959) 296-97 for a listing of sources
dealing with the difficult problems of administration of zoning ordinances.
The author believes that grave problems exist in this area of zoning
today.
8' Perhaps the courts are also disturbed by the fact that it is the
municipal legislature who is doing the bargaining rather than the board of
zoning appeals. The courts may feel that if the latter were making the
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certainly do add to the courts' general apprehension that
they cannot control the possible dangers of favoritism,
corruption and irrelevant considerations in the passage of
zoning amendments. As things stand now,
"If the court to which the question is eventually taken
believes the governmental action to be arbitrary and
improper, that action is branded as spot-zoning. If not,
it is called a planned readjustment."86
In addition to the possible evils of normal zoning
amendments without conditions, contract zoning has addi-
tional elements that have already been mentioned. Con-
tract zoning appears to resemble the very process the
courts fear. Instead of making a considered judgment
whether rezoning is proper, the official and the property
owner seemed to have been closeted in a bargaining session,
out of which has come a compromise which bypasses the
present zoning scheme for illegitimate purposes.
But not all courts are so suspicious of the motives and
actions of public officials. Even before the Church case
upheld contract zoning in New York, there was a decision
by its Supreme Court, 7 the trial court of general jurisdic-
tion, in a case that closely resembles a contract zoning
situation.88 That case voiced a general willingness to trust
public officials. The case involved the sale of unneeded
public lands where the contract of sale was made condi-
deals they would be less subject to unjustifiable political or policy con-
siderations. But one may have strong doubts as to the greater quality or
integrity of the members of this public body. In some communities they
are no doubt public-spirited citizens of the highest probity and caliber.
In other municipalities they may well be political hacks who may have
received this position for political services rendered, or for even more
nefarious purposes. Moreover, they may be less accountable for their
actions because of a long tenure that these positions sometimes have.
In the cases supporting and striking down the zoning amendment and
the agreement, the municipal legislature was both supported and op-
posed by the planning commission or the board of zoning appeals. The
opposition to the plan by the planning commission in Church v. Town of
Islip, supra, n. 60, was not considered significant by the court in that
case. 'But in Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148 A. 2d 429
(1959) the antipathy toward the plan of the planning commission may
have raised doubts in the court of the motivations of the public officials
involved. But we have no clear statement by the court of the importance it
placed on the position of the planning commission involved. Nor do we
have 'any information as to the quality or integrity of that body.
Haar, supra, n. 58, 1167.
8O'Shea v. Hanse, N.Y. Law Journal, May 7, 1959, p. 13, (Suffolk
County) (unreported).
OsThe plaintiff had argued that this was a "zoning by contract" case.
Analysis shows that it isn't. It is clear that the officials may sell the
land; the only issue was whether the rezoning was proper. There were
no conditions being placed on the private persons purchasing -the prop-
erty.
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tional upon the rezoning of the property to commercial
uses. The approval of the sale and the rezoning were to
be made by the same public body. A suit was brought to
enjoin the sale by a resident who argued that the body's
interest in the consummation of the contract of sale would
influence and deprive them of the fair exercise of judgment
in the subsequent request for rezoning. The court found
that the rezoning was in fact proper and added this state-
ment.
"This court is aware that it has been fashionable for
many years to excoriate public officials as being un-
trustworthy, to imply baseness to their motives, and
to subject them to the severest criticisms for their
public acts. Under such conditions it is amazing that
responsible citizens continue to shoulder the burden
of public office, and it is not unlikely that communities
have been deprived of the services of many capable
persons, because of this 'fashion.' "89
Perhaps these differences in outlook reflect a judgment
by the judiciary of each state of the public officials in the
state. In any case, the issue of the propriety of zoning
amendments and contract zoning rests in part on a basic
judgment as to the quality and honesty of public officials.
There is still a second major consideration in determin-
ing whether the courts should find contract zoning author-
ized. So far the discussion has dealt only with the question
whether any conditions lawfully may be imposed. There
is also, however, the question whether there is or should be
any limitation on the conditions that can be asked of the
property owner. This further consideration has not been
mentioned by the courts because of the nature of the suits
that have been brought against contract zoning. The plain-
tiffs have been neighboring residents who did not want the
rezoning under any circumstances. But what if the party
bringing the suit is the property owner? What should be
done if there is a legitimate request for rezoning, but the
pressure put on the officials by the residents of the area is
such that the public officials, though willing to approve the
rezoning, are forced to demand the acceptance of burden-
some and coercive conditions? In addition, the motives of
the public officials may be even less justifiable. They may
be seeking to exploit their power to refuse to act to extract
from some property owner the cost of a public improve-
ment. For example, desirous of getting an easement or a
1 Supra, n. 87.
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piece of land for a park, the public officials demand these
things as a consideration for the rezoning.
This is the other side of the coin of favoritism - co-
ercion. The power to rezone subject to conditions makes
possible the coercion. Without the power, this compulsion
could not exist. Though the community might then refuse
to rezone at all, in which case the property owner may feel
himself worse off, there is a great value in making clear
to public officials that if they do act, it cannot be in an
arbitrary manner.
When it is the neighboring property owners complaining
of the rezoning, they may and probably do form a sizable
group such that they exert enough political pressure to at
least assure themselves of a fair hearing. When the situa-
tion is reversed, and it is the one property owner complain-
ing, his political influence may be minimal. The very
nature of contract zoning-the uniqueness of each situation
- make it likely that the power to impose conditions will
be directed against a small number of persons. The de-
sirability of allowing contract zoning diminishes, even
more, when we look at cases of coercion in the area of
variances and subdivision control that closely resemble
contract zoning cases.
In Assessors of Dover v. Dominican Fathers, etc.,90 in
exchange for a variance the city demanded that a valuable
tax exemption be given up. The court held the demand
illegal. In Gregory Manor v. City of Clifton9' the plaintiff
alleged that he had given park land to the city in reliance
on the city's agreement to rezone a portion of his land for
a shopping center. He further alleged that the city would
not approve the rest of his subdivision plan without the
dedication of park land. As he had financial obligations to
meet, he could not afford to take the time to challenge the
legitimacy of the condition which he had a legal right to
do. Plaintiff deeded the land without getting the rezoning
he had desired. He sued for the return of the land or its
value. The court found that the dedication of the park
land could properly be asked and that no agreement to
rezone in exchange for the park land was made. But if it
were, it would have been illegal. The case shows the diffi-
culty of proving coercion in many cases. In a third case,
the city demanded either an easement without cost for a
drainage pipe or that the property owner install the pipe
in exchange for a requested rezoning. The court recognized
that the conditions were highly coercive and illegal, but
0334 Mass. 530, 137 N.E. 2d 225 (1956).
153 N.J. Super. 482, 147 A. 2d 595 (1959).
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ruled that plaintiff had no cause of action for other
reasons.
92
Each of these cases93 illustrate that the danger of un-
justifiable pressure is not unreal for in each of these cases
the conditions imposed went far beyond those in the
Hartnett or Baylis cases. On the other hand, it is true that
the property owners in the contract zoning cases are not
without any political influence. Since the proposed use of
the property in a contract zoning case is normally com-
mercial, city officials who are desirous of added taxables
to meet ever increasing municipal expense budgets, will
often place reasonable limits on their demands. But then
again the officials may have no particular interest in the
project; in that situation, there are still less controls on the
demands that can be made.
It can be argued that the courts could also control the
problem by distinguishing proper from improper condi-
tions by seeing whether the conditions imposed do increase
the compatibility of uses in the area.94 The courts could
easily distinguish the Hartnett and Assessors of Dover
cases, since the tax revenues the property yields has little
to do with its physical desirability. But would it be un-
reasonable for public officials to say that parks near a
commercial area or improved drainage in the area would
make the commercial use more acceptable?
Because of the danger of favoritism without considera-
tion of the community's need, on the one hand, and of un-
fair pressures on the property owners, on the other, it
might be wise for courts not to accept contract zoning with-
out statutory authorization. The situation would appear to
be an appropriate one for the state legislature to weigh all
the advantages and disadvantages of contract zoning.
CONCLUSION
Contract zoning was developed by public officials as a
response to the cumbersomeness of the present system of
zoning by districting. Perhaps, someday, zoning by per-
formance standards will provide the needed flexibility to
2 Besselman v. City of Moses Lake, 46 Wash. 2d 279, 280 P. 2d 689
(1955). The plaintiff had no cause of action because the city decided not
to rezone at all. Had the rezoning gone through and if the condition
was later challenged by the property owner, this would have been an
example of coercion in a contract zoning situation.
" See also the otherwise unreported case of Kulzer v. Boyenski, N.Y.
Law Journal, Dec. 10, 1956, (Nassau County) where in exchange for a
variance the town demanded that the property owner give up his right
to just compensation if and when a proposed highway is built.
" The Court in Church v. Town of Islip, 8upra, n. 77 did this.
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solve the problems that have given rise to contract zoning.
Contract zoning, however, though it occupies a very small
role in the scheme of land use control in America today,
raises deeper questions than that of proper land use controls
on the borders of zoning districts.
Whenever public officials, acting in their role as exer-
cisers of the police power, contract with private parties,
there is a desire to ensure that the power is exercised
honestly, fairly, and for a legitimate need.
It might be worthwhile to compare briefly how these
goals of official responsibility are achieved when a contract
is made under an exercise of the power of eminent domain
in the land use planning area. Many states have passed
urban redevelopment statutes which have authorized the
municipality or specially created agencies to condemn land
and sell that land to private developers for urban renewal
projects 5 Each of the statutes authorizes the agency to
make any necessary contracts with the developer, and full
power is given to the officials to draw up the terms of the
general plan and the contract carrying out that plan 6
Such breadth of authority makes control by the courts of
the contract improbable, if not impossible. The truth of this
statement can be seen in the paucity of cases challenging
the terms of an urban redevelopment contract.
In one of the few cases, Schenk v. City of Pittsburgh,97
a property owner whose land was about to be taken for an
urban renewal project in Pittsburgh's Golden Triangle
challenged the contract made by the public authorities on
the ground that the contract did not provide effective pro-
tection for the public. He argued that the contract pro-
vided for immediate transfer of the land to the private
developer without assurance that the project would be
carried out. The court found generally that the public
interest was protected by the contract, but dealt with the
5 New Jersey, which has held contract zoning invalid, has an Urban
Redevelopment Statute N.J.S.A. (Cum. Supp. 1960) 55: 14 E-1 - et 8eq.
The provision authorizing the making of any necessary contract is 55:
14 E-5. New York's Statute was recently revised. 23 MoKINNEy's CoNsoL.
LAWS (Cum. Supp. 1962) At. 15. The section dealing with the disposition
of the property condemned is § 507.
. § 507, for example, does not require public bidding among re-
developers for the land condemned. The amount of the subsidy is thus
left to the public official's discretion. In neither New York nor New
Jersey, which have had tremendous urban renewal projects, has there
been any judicial decisions concerning the validity of the terms of the
contracts made with the developers with the possible exception of the
racial discrimination case discussed in n. 99.
9364 Pa. 31, 70 A. 2d 612 (1950) ; See also Oliver v. City of Clairton,
374 Pa. 333, 98 A. 2d 47 (1953) ; Gbhold Realty Co. v. City of Hartford, 141
Conn. 135, 104 A. 2d 365 (1954).
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issue of controls over the Pittsburgh Redevelopment Au-
thority's agreement with private developers, by stating
that it was not for the courts to say how the contract can
be improved 5
If this reflects the general attitude of the courts, then,
inevitably, assurance that the public interest will be pro-
tected must rest on the political process. Possibly the
courts would set aside a redevelopment contract involving
fraud by or bribery of public officials or a clear violation
of the statute. But the history of urban renewal has shown
that this issue of official honesty or public need in the
making of these contracts has initially not been raised in
the courts 9 Part of the explanation for the difference be-
tween the contract zoning situation and the urban renewal
contract is simple. The courts have always been much more
active in controlling the exercise of the police power be-
cause of its regulatory nature and, consequently, its direct
effect on the conduct of citizens. In dealing with the
eminent domain power, however, the courts have usually
thought of the municipality as dealing with its own prop-
erty. If this power is abused, the harm is done to the
community, not to an individual.
- Id., 615.
' For a typical example, see the history of the removal of Hulan Jack
as Borough President of Manhattan on a charge of violating the city's
conflict of interests laws. The initial evidence was brought out in a
series of articles in the New York Post. New York Times, Dec. 16, 1959,
1 : 1. There was, however, nbo finding of actual betrayal of the public
interest. New York Times Index - 1959, p. 459; 1960 p. 466.
See also the history of the Cadman Housing Project in Brooklyn, New
York, where though there was a clearly demonstrated need for middle-
income housing in the area, It was not until a great effort by the
Community Conservation & Improvement Council, neighborhood groups
and private persons that public officials agreed that the project should
provide middle income housing. New York Times Index - 1959, p. 160;
1960, p. 466.
For an interesting variation of this problem see Dorsey v. Stuyvesant
Town Corporation, 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E. 2d 541, cert. den. 339 U.S.
981 (1949) involving the exclusion of Negroes from the Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co.'s giant Stuyvesant Town housing project in New
York City. The Court of Appeals held that the exclusion by the insur-
ance company did not constitute public action and so did not violate the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It should be noted,
however, that when the contract was made between the city and the
insurance company, the city knew that the insurance company intended to
discriminate. Though the court found this legally irrelevant, the situa-
tion created a political uproar, and shortly after the Metropolitan contract
was signed, the city council passed a statute requiring any future project
to rent on a non-discriminating basis.
-Prior to all this, the project was unsuccessfully challenged on the
ground that the enabling statute violated the state constitution on the
grounds it allowed illegal gains by private persons. Murray v. LaGuardia,
291 N.Y. 320, 52 N.E. 2d 884, cert. den. 321 U.S. 771 (1943).
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Both contract zoning and urban renewal contract cases
reflect an ever present issue constantly faced by a demo-
cratic society. There is the push to limit the discretion of
public officials by definite statutory standards for only in
this way can the people be assured that there will be no
arbitrariness and discrimination either in the form of favor-
itism or oppression. On the other hand, there is the need
that the necessary power and discretion be given to re-
sponsible public officials so that they may meet the prob-
lems of our complex society swiftly and precisely. Perhaps
these conflicting needs can be completely reconciled or
reasonably balanced. In any case, contract zoning is an
example in miniature of this basic conflict.
